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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, the US banking market has undergone a notable process of consolidation 
that has reduced the number of banking entities and transformed their branch networks. The 
liberalization of the market, initiated with the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, favored the expansion 
of bank entities into other states and contributed to the increase in the number of bank branches. 
This situation was reversed, however, after the 2007–2008 financial crises and the Great 
Recession. Between 2008 and 2016, six per cent of branches were lost nationally, a situation 
that has continued apace in subsequent years. Urban areas have suffered high levels of closure 
and rural ‘banking deserts’ have become familiar features on the landscape. All in all, this 
process has raised concerns that a growing number of households and business might be losing 
adequate access to financial services. Branch closures increase consumers’ financial services 
costs, such as cashing checks, obtaining loans or simply opening deposit accounts. On the one 
hand, they are forced to travel longer distances to contract the services; and, on the other, staff 
re-organizations mean customers lose the personal advisory services they could expect from 
their traditional bank tellers. An additional problem is that this process of ‘financial exclusion’ 
may be more intense in areas with higher proportions of low-income families and minorities, 
groups that frequently have limited mobility and lower rates of Internet access (Sinclair, 2001; 
Carbo et al. 2007; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Ergungor, 2010; Nguyen, 2014).1  
 
This article examines the transformation of the brick-and-mortar branch structure in the United 
States banking system in the period 2000–2014. We seek to analyze the factors affecting the 
presence of bank branches in different geographical areas of the country, before and after the 
Great Recession. The first part of the paper focusses on the impact of mergers during the period 
examined, showing that they led to an expansion of branch networks in the pre-crisis period 
and to branch closures after the crisis. The second part of the paper discusses on the 
consequences of branch closures for financial exclusion. 
 
                                                          
1 Financial exclusion can also affect social capital and economic growth at the local level. Bruhn and Love (2014), 
for example, show that improved access to financial services had pronounced effects on real economic outcomes 
for low-income households in Mexico.  
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Bank branches play a fundamental role in the functioning of the banking sector. Despite the 
technological evolution and the widespread adoption of on-line banking, brick-and-mortar 
offices remain a primary mechanism of contact between customers and financial agents (FDIC, 
2018). Bank branches allow customers to perform those activities that have not yet been 
replaced by on-line banking, such as cash transactions, obtaining financial advice and 
contracting services such as credit facilities and insurance products. In this context, the closure 
of branches in certain locations worsens the access of consumers to their entities and may 
exclude them from using some financial services. Banks also lose with the closures as their 
employees have fewer incentives to generate soft information, although this can partly be offset 
by reduction of the premises costs and with introducing more rigid practices for screening 
customers.  
 
The commercial strategy of banking entities has changed notably in recent decades. Before the 
Great Recession, US banks opted to expand their retail networks so as to increase their 
efficiency and reduce risks. The 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act promoted unrestricted nationwide banking and branching activities, and favored the use of 
mergers to gain access to new markets.2 In the ‘90s, non-bank competitors (such as 
supermarkets) emerged as an alternative means for providing financial services. In this context 
large banks sought the Riegle-Neal Act as an opportunity to expand into other states to gain 
scale, become more diversified and consolidate their position (Elfakhani et al., 2003; and Allen 
et al., 2015). Another important factor that transformed the sector in these years was the 
adoption of digital technologies, which reduced banks’ operating costs and improved their 
information systems. Those banks that could not afford the expense of investing in new 
technologies became targets for acquisition.  
 
The path of evolution taken by the sector shifted notably during the Great Recession. After 
2007, a series of regulations were introduced to prevent future crises. These measures limited 
the entry of new banks, which in previous years was an important mechanism for replacing 
                                                          
2 The US banking industry has undergone a number of waves of mergers of varying intensity. According to 
Elfakhani et al. (2003), “Banking analysts agree that increasing competition, deregulation, technological 
advancements, bank failures, cost savings, and the desire to form one-stop financial centres are among the major 
factors driving the continuing consolidation trend.” 
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bank failures in many local markets. Moreover, the reduction in the banks’ profitability due to 
the reduction in the demand and the low interest margins favored the continuation of mergers 
in the sector. In contrast to the expansion mergers of the pre-crisis period, these mergers led to 
branch closures that helped banks to reduce costs and adjust to the competitive pressure of on-
line banking.3  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the factors influencing the deployment of bank branches in 
the US, before and after the 2008 financial crisis. For the pre-crisis period we consider the 
years from 2000 to 2007, which are characterized by significant economic expansion. For the 
post-crisis period we examine the years of economic crisis and subsequent recovery up to 2014. 
Our analysis draws on a rich dataset for 3,090 counties in the 50 states of the United States and 
the District of Columbia. Information about bank branches at the county level has been 
obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). County-level demographic 
and socio-economic variables are taken from the US Census Bureau. 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of mergers on the banks’ branching policy. A key 
feature of our identification strategy is that the merger decisions taken by bank entities are 
exogenous to the idiosyncratic situation of the counties before the mergers. In this sense, we 
only consider mergers between banks of different states (inter-states mergers) and mergers 
between banks that belong to the same state but with headquarters in different counties (intra-
states/inter county mergers).  
 
The results indicate a positive effect of mergers on the number of bank branches when we 
consider the whole period 2000-2014, but when we split the period in the pre and the post-
crisis period we obtain interesting heterogeneous effects.  Before 2008, mergers had an overall 
positive effect on bank density, but while mergers in metropolitan counties increased the 
number of branches, those in micropolitan and rural counties decreased it. This implies that the 
“consolidation process” that has experienced the market in the last decades was complemented 
in these years with a number of “expansion mergers”, which were especially important in 
                                                          
3 Allen et al. (2009) analyze the effects of market structure in the diffusion of e-banking in Canada for the period 
1998–2006. They show that banks have more incentives to reduce the number of branches and to promote e-
banking in regions where competition is intense. 
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metropolitan counties. This situation changed with the financial crisis. After 2008, inter-state 
bank mergers had a negative impact on branch density in all counties, with a stronger effect in 
micropolitan and rural counties. Moreover, intra-state/inter county mergers did not affect the 
number of branches. Another interesting result to emerge from our analysis is that broadband 
penetration contributed to the reduction of branch density. This is can be a consequence of the 
generalization of on-line baking, but it is important to remark that broadband penetration is low 
in non-core counties and in counties with a higher proportion of vulnerable population. Finally, 
the paper concludes with a discussion of the effects of branch closures on financial exclusion. 
We show that after 2008 the share of unbanked and underbanked households at the county level 
was positively associated with branch closures and negatively related with the presence of 
community banks, which are characterized as having a closer relationship with costumers.  
 
Several papers have analyzed the branching strategy of banking entities in the US. While some 
authors have focused on the effects of branch competition on prices (Sapienza, 2002), others 
have considered its implications for service quality (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003; Panetta et al., 
2009), firm-bank relationships (Karceski et al., 2005; Panetta et al., 2009), consumer 
bankruptcies (Allen et al., 2016) and for the efficiency and the stability of bank entities 
(Calomiris, 2000; and Aguirregabiria et al., 2016). There is also a group of papers examining 
the determinants of branch expansion and new charter formation. Amel and Liang (1997) 
analyze bank entry in over 2,000 US banking markets in the period 1977–1988, showing the 
relevance of population growth and the incumbent profits. Adams and Amel (2007) study bank 
entry from 1994 to 2008, obtaining that local market demand and past entry are positively 
associated with entry, and that incumbent branch expansion and small bank presence deter 
entry.  Cohen and Mazzeo (2010) assess the competitive consequences of the sectorial reforms 
in the nineties that allowed banks to spread across multiple markets. They examine competition 
in 1,882 rural markets for 2005. They show that while competition from traditional single-
market banks and saving banks is associated with smaller branching networks, all types of 
institutions tend to have more branches when competing with multimarket banks in order to be 
more competitive.  
 
Our paper contributes to this literature by showing the heterogeneous impacts of mergers in 
branch deployment. We distinguish between two groups of mergers; inter-state mergers in 
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which the merging entities have their headquarters in different states, and intra-state/inter-
county mergers in which the merging entities have their headquarters in the same state, but in 
different counties. We examine the impact of these two types of mergers in the pre and post-
crisis periods and we also look at the differential effects in three types of counties; metropolitan, 
micropolitan and rural counties.  
 
Our paper is also closely related to the literature analysing the effects of branch deployment on 
financial exclusion. Branches can alleviate information frictions by collecting soft information 
about the neighborhoods in which they operate and about their customers. In this sense, 
Celerier and Matray (2018) exploit the staggered interstate branching deregulation in the US 
after the Riegle-Neal Act as an exogenous shock on bank competition, and show how the 
competition resulting from these regulations reduced the share of unbanked households, 
benefiting lower-income households and those living in rural areas. Following this argument, 
in the second part of our paper we examine the impact of branch closings after the 2008 crisis 
and we obtain that they are associated with higher shares of unbanked and underbanked 
consumers. This is also in line with the literature showing that the distance between lenders 
and borrowers determines the availability and terms of credit, especially in low-income 
neighborhoods (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Houswald, 2010; Ergungor, 2010; 
Brown, 2016; Allen et al., 2012; Martin-Oliver, 2019).  
 
The literature has also examined the relationship between mergers and banking exclusion. 
Allen et al. (2015) analyze how a merger between Toronto Dominion and Canada Trust in 2000 
affected consumer bankruptcy. They find that local markets affected by a merger exhibited a 
temporary increase in consumer bankruptcy rates post-merger, which is explained by the 
replacement of the target management and loan officers that can typically act as the depositaries 
of soft information. Finally, two recent works use mergers as an exogenous variation in local 
market to explore the effect of bank branches in small business lending.4 Nguyen (2019) 
                                                          
4 The effects of banks characteristics on small business lending have been also studied in other papers. Some show 
that stronger bank-borrower relationships are associated with better treatment for borrowers, in terms of lower 
interest rates and reduced collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995), increased credit availability (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995, Cole, 1998) and more protection against interest rate shocks (Berlin and Mester, 1998). Other 
papers have examined how lending practices differ between large and small banks, obtaining that small banks rely 
more on soft information (Cole, 2004; Berger et al. 2005). 
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analyzes the level of lending to small firms in neighborhood exposed to the merge of large 
banks in the period 1999-2012. She shows that branch closings that follow mergers between 
large banks lead to prolonged declines in local small business lending, indicating that 
borrowers who lose access to credit have difficulty obtaining credit from other banks. Jagtiani 
and Maingi (2019) investigate the impact of mergers affecting community banks on local small 
business lending in the period 2002-2014. They obtain that relative to counties where the 
acquirer bank had operations before the merger, local small business lending declined 
significantly more in counties where only the target bank had operations before the merger. 
This implies that the absence in the county of community banks has led local business to a 
credit gap that has not been filled by the rest of the banking sector.5  
 
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the main episodes in the US 
banking market before and after the Great Recession. Section 3 establishes the main hypothesis 
of our paper. Section 4 describes the dataset, outlines the main market trends, and explains our 
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results of our analysis. Section 6 discusses the effects 
of branch closures on financial exclusion. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. The US banking market before and after the Great Recession 
 
Banking deregulation has been an important determinant for the deployment of bank branches 
since the end of the 1990s. In 1927, the McFadden Act implicitly prohibited commercial banks 
from interstate branching. In the following years, bank holding companies were created to 
circumvent the law and they acquired branches across states, but such practices were 
terminated with the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. These policies had resulted in a 
banking system composed largely of thousands of small, independent banks. According to 
McCord et al. (2015), in the period 1960–80, there were between 12 and 13 thousand 
independent banks in the United States.6 
                                                          
5 More generally, the relevance of soft information for small firms lending is discussed in Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Cole (1998). 
6 Copeland et al. (1995) record two waves of mergers in this period, in the mid-1960s and in the late 1980s 
extending until 1998. Elfakhani et al. (2003) explain that since then such waves have been frequent.  
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This situation was to change in 1994, when the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act (Riegle-Neal Act) permitted bank holding companies to enter other states and operate 
branches. Initially, the Act allowed states to set up certain barriers to protect their banks, but 
this measure was later relaxed.7 In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act promoted the integration 
of the commercial and investment functions of these entities.8 These decisions enhanced 
competition and led to the consolidation of the sector through mergers and acquisitions 
(Chaddock, 1994; Vives, 2016). One consequence of these reforms was a reduction in the 
number of banks, with the smaller, weaker entities being acquired by other institutions to gain 
economies of scale. During these years the number of banks continued to decrease and fell to 
around 10,000 by 2000. On the other hand, the consolidation of the sector led to a reduction of 
bank offices until 1993 and since then the number of branches increase until 2009, reaching a 
peak of nearly 100,000 offices (FDIC, 2012). 
 
The Riegle-Neal Act eliminated many of the restrictions on the acquisition of interstate banks 
and permitted the creation of “interstate branches”. It authorized the creation of Bank Holding 
Companies that could acquire banks anywhere in the United States and diversify their assets. 
The objective of the reform was to increase the efficiency of financial institutions, permitting 
the conversion of their banking subsidiaries into bank branches and, thus, eliminating indirect 
costs (McLaughlin, 1995). 
 
After 2007, the failure to detect the financial crisis led to the implementation of a series of 
mechanisms to prevent future problems in the sector. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 aimed to 
protect consumers, discipline banks, avoid bank bailouts and create banks that were “too big 
to fail”. This generated a series of reforms of the securities market, the regulation of derivatives 
and the reform of rating agencies (Vives, 2016 and 2019). The Act requires the Federal Reserve 
System to impose stricter controls on supervised and unregulated banks (shadow banks) that 
                                                          
7 The liberalization of the sector was initiated in the ‘70s, when the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 promoted 
competition by eliminating the distinction between the banks and other financial institutions. These laws sought 
to favor competition and efficiency, but actually generated instability in the sector. More than 500 entities went 
bankrupt between 1980 and the beginning of the 1990s. 
8 This measure reversed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and allowed commercial and investment banking activities 
to be conducted within the same financial company (Bergia, 2014). 
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have assets valued at more than $50 billion. In addition, it implemented reforms that affect the 
banking structure, by introducing a degree of separation between the banks’ commercial and 
investment activities.  
 
More recently, the digitalization of the economy has had a major disruptive impact on the 
traditional banking sector. On-line banking represents a cost saving compared to brick-and-
mortar branches and has drastically changed the retail business. However, technological 
innovations have not yet eliminated the need for branch networks that can serve consumers, 
although the frequency of branch use has clearly fallen (FDIC, 2018).  
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution in the number of banking institutions and branches in the US 
from 2000 to 2014. While the number of banking entities fell throughout the whole period, the 
number of branches increased until 2007 and then fell after the Great Recession. The reduction 
in the number of branches after the financial and economic crisis can be explained by the 
increasing consolidation of the banking sector and the increasing use of bank services via the 
Internet.  
 
The fall in the total number of banks throughout the period represents a continuation of the 
trend that began in the 1980s, and these exit rates do not differ greatly from those recorded in 
previous periods. After 2007, the reduction in the number of banking entities is driven not by 
the increase in bank failures but by the lack of bank entry. As McCord et al. (2015) explain, 
from 2009 through 2013 bank entry fell to almost zero.9 Likewise, branch expansion into new 
geographic markets, which was a relevant form of bank entry in previous years, has also 
declined dramatically. 
 
Adams and Gramlich (2014) maintain that the decline in new bank entry is due in large part to 
low bank profitability. The Fed’s policy of keeping the federal funds rate near zero since 2008 
                                                          
9 Adams and Gramlich (2014) show that the number of new bank charters in the United States has declined in 
recent years.  From 1990 to 2008, over 2,000 new banks were formed, more than 100 per year.  From 2009 to 
2013, only seven new banks were formed, fewer than 2 per year. Tranfaglia (2018) examines spatial patterns in 
bank branch closures within the Philadelphia, Chicago and Baltimore metropolitan areas in the period 2010–2016. 
She shows evidence of branch closure clustering at short distances (2-5 km) in both Chicago and Philadelphia 
MSAs, but not in Baltimore. Banks tend to maintain their branches in urban areas and reduce their presence in 
quasi-urban and rural areas.  
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has pushed lending rates down, which has kept the net interest margin relatively small. The 
reduction in bank entry can also be explained by the weak demand for banking services and by 
the implementation of new banking regulations (e.g. Dodd-Frank Act and FDIC regulations) 
that reduced the profitability of de novo banks.  
 
3. Mechanisms and hypothesis 
 
This section establishes the main hypothesis examined in our empirical analysis. Our first 
objective is to study the effect of mergers on bank branches in the period from 2000 to 2014. 
Following the literature we can identify two types of mergers that took place in this period. 
First, “expansion mergers” were used as a mechanism to enter in new markets, allowing banks 
to expand their activity, reduce costs, and diversify their assets (McLaughlin, 1995, 
Aguirregabiria et al. 2016). After the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act, banks used inter-state and intra-
state mergers to expand their commercial networks and to attract consumers from their 
competitors (Cohen and Mazzeo, 2010). Our hypothesis is that “expansion mergers” intensified 
competition in local markets and lead to the creation of new branches. Moreover, we expect 
these mergers to be more relevant in metropolitan counties where banks were better able to 
exploit scale economies and competition was stronger. 
 
Second, “consolidation mergers” have been used by banks to increase market power and to 
reduce costs. Our hypothesis is that these mergers offset “expansion mergers” after 2008 and 
implied a net reduction of branch density. After the 2008 crisis, the Federal Reserve’s policy 
of keeping the federal funds rate near zero pushed lending rates down, which kept the net 
interest margin relatively small. This situation, coupled with the demand reduction (e.g. loans 
and deposit‐taking services) and the implementation of new banking regulations (e.g. Dodd-
Frank Act and FDIC regulations) reduced the profitability of banks and give rise to mergers 
aimed at reducing premises costs and improving efficiency. After a merge, the branches of the 
buyer and the target entities overlap in some neighborhoods and these geographic redundancies 
can lead to branch closures. We expect the reduction in the number of branches to be more 
important in metropolitan counties and for large banks, as in these cases branch duplications in 
local markets is more likely. 
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The second objective of the paper is to analyze whether branch closures have increased 
financial exclusion. Specifically, we want to examine whether the number of branches in local 
markets and the size of the banks affects consumers’ access to financial services. The 
theoretical model of Stein (2002) shows that small banks are at a comparative advantage in 
evaluating household loans and investments projects of small-business. On the one hand, 
employees of small entities are closer to the consumers and have stronger incentives to generate 
soft information. On the other hand, the interests of the managers of small banks are more 
aligned with those of the shareholders and might dedicate more effort to build soft-information. 
By contrast, larger and hierarchic entities perform better when “hard information” can be easily 
examined and passed along inside the bank entity. The employees of these entities can be more 
effective in dealing with consumers that can be assessed by means of standardized measures 
(income statements, credit rating, balance sheet, etc.) but they have fewer incentives to generate 
“soft information”. Several recent works have analyzed the relevance of bank size (Berger et 
al. 2005), the distance to the branch offices (Nguyen, 2019), and the presence of community 
banks (Kowalik, 2014; Berger, Cerqueiro, and Penas, 2014; Jagtiani, Kotliar, and Maingi, 
2016; and Jagtiani and Maingi, 2019), on the access to credit by small business.  
 
Following the predictions of these works, the hypotheses we test in the second part of the paper 
are two-fold. First, we examine whether the reduction of bank branches at the county level 
increased the percentage of the population that is unbanked or underbanked. We expect branch 
closures to increase financial exclusion, as consumers have to travel longer distances to visit 
their branch and bank employees have less valuable soft information about consumers. Second, 
we want to analyze whether community banks are effective in reducing financial exclusion. 
Community banks are small entities with a reduced number of branches that carry out the 
traditional banking functions of lending and deposit gathering on a local scale, and are 
characterized by local ownership and local decision making. These entities are considered to 
be “relationship” bankers and we expect their presence in a county to be associated with a lower 
prevalence of unbanked and underbanked consumers.10 
                                                          
10 Most studies define community banks as those that have a maximum asset size of $1 billion. FDIC (2012) 
considers a wider definition around criteria related to traditional lending and deposit gathering activities and 
limited geographic scope. As a result, they identify 7,658 FDIC-insured community banks operating within 6,914 
separate banking organizations (or 94 percent of all banking organizations). This definition captures 330 banks 
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4. Data, trends and methods 
4.1 Data 
 
We draw on a dataset for 3,090 counties in the 50 states of the United States and the District 
of Columbia for the period 2000–2014.11 The information has been obtained from the Summary 
of Deposit (SOD) and the Reports of Structure Changes (ROC) provided by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The SOD data are collected for all institutions insured by the 
FDIC, including commercial banks and savings and loans associations, and describe the 
financial situation (deposits and assets) and bank specificities (type of financial service, 
address, bank affiliation, etc.) at branch-level. The ROC data also describe the non-financial 
activities of all entities insured by the FDIC, capturing institutional and structural changes 
including mergers, failures and new offices of financial entities.  
 
Our analysis is conducted at the county level and, for this reason, we aggregate local branch 
information. Specifically, we calculate the number of branches, inter-state and intra-state 
mergers and bank entries and exits affecting each county and calculate market concentration 
by using banks’ deposits in each county. County-level demographic and socio-economic 
variables are taken from the US Census Bureau. The Census also provides the counties’ land 
area used in calculating population densities. Data for broadband penetration – a proxy for 
internet banking – is obtained from the Center for Policy Informatics at Arizona State 
University, which for the period we study has collected information for 328 counties (most of 
them metropolitan  counties).  
 
Finally, we analyze the effect of branch closures on financial exclusion with the use of an 
additional FDIC dataset, “The National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households” 
(NSUUH). This is a biennial survey that was first conducted in June 2009 and which 
incorporates supplementary questions to those contained in the “Current Population Survey” 
                                                          
that might have been excluded with the standard definition. In this paper we consider community banks as those 
banks with either 3 or more branches and a number of assets that are less than 1 billion dollars 
11 Our analysis excludes eight overseas states: these are American Samoa, Federal States of Micronesia, Guam, 
Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands. The dataset also excludes 
branches that do not hold any deposits and entities that are not for commercial use or which provide a limited 
customer service. These offices represent around 4% of the FDIC dataset. 
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conducted by the US Census Bureau. We use the NSUUH for the years 2009, 2011, 2013 and 
2015, and combine these data with the SOD. Our dataset contains 317,036 observations, 
corresponding to 112,892 households living in 368 counties (most of them metropolitan 
counties) in the period 2009–2015. Note that these data are aggregated at the county level so 
in the end we have 1,093 observations for our analysis of unbanked households and 899 
observations for our analysis of underbanked households.12   
 
4.2 Basic trends 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of bank entities and branches in the period 2000–2014. Between 
2000 and 2009 the number of bank entities decreased at an annual rate of 2.24%, and between 
2009 and 2014 at a rate of 3.85%. By contrast, the number of branches increased between 2000 
and 2009 at an annual average rate of 1.92% and decreased afterwards at a rate of 0.82%. 
Notice that since the financial crisis of 2008 the total population in the United States increased 
by 4.5%, which means that the average number of inhabitants served by each bank branch 
increased by approximately 10% (Table A1).13  
 
The number of bank branches varies markedly across counties. Figure 2 shows that in 2014 
about one third of counties had five branches or fewer, and almost one in four had between six 
and ten branches. Yet, about 15% of the counties had more than 30 branches. These differences 
in the number of branches make evident the differences in the counties’ relative rates of 
profitability. 
 
Following the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), we classify counties as either 
metropolitan (urban) or non-metropolitan counties (rural). In turn, the latter can be divided into 
two categories: micropolitan and non-core counties. Metropolitan counties are those that 
include at least one urban core of 50,000 people or more. Micropolitan counties are those with 
an urban core of 10,000 to 50,000 people and non-core counties are those with an urban core 
                                                          
12 The NSUUH provides weights to account for the representativeness of all the households used in our analysis. 
13 Maudos and Vives (2019) analyze the banking system of the European Union during this period. They explain 
that the 2007-2009 crises ended an expansion period of the banking system and initiate a restructuring process 
that lead to many mergers and acquisitions. Between 1997 and 2017, the number of credit institutions was reduced 
by 43% and the number of bank branches by 17%. 
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population of fewer than 10,000 people. In 2014, there were 1,217 metropolitan counties in our 
sample, 646 micropolitan counties, and 1,311 non-core counties.  
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution in the average number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants in the 
three types of counties. The evolution of branch density is similar for all counties. In the pre-
crisis period from 2000 to 2007, there was a growth in branch density, which was more intense 
in rural counties. In the post-crisis period from 2008 to 2014, there was a decline in branch 
density, which was weaker in rural counties. 
 
Mergers have had a relevant impact on the presence of bank branches at the county level. 
Following the Riegle Neal Act of 1994, bank entities engaged in both intra- and inter-state 
mergers aimed at gaining scale and geographically diversifying their risks. After the financial 
crisis of 2008, banks used mergers to consolidate their position in an environment of weak 
demand and strong competition. Figure 4 shows that the number of metropolitan counties 
affected by mergers has been particularly high (798 counties in 2014, representing the 62 % of 
the total), but mergers have also affected a high number of non-core counties (62% of 
micropolitan counties and 42% of rural counties), which is especially relevant for competition 
taking into account that they have a smaller number of branches. Also notice that in the whole 
period 831 counties were affected by one merger, 449 by two mergers, and 545 by more than 
two mergers. 
 
Figure 5 shows the bank entities classified according to the number of branches they operate. 
Panel A shows the situation in 2000 and panel B in 2014. In 2000, more than 50% of bank 
entities were community banks that had one or two branches (31.7% of the entities had only 
one branch and 19.1% had two). On the opposite side, only five entities had more than 1,000 
branches: Wells Fargo Bank (1,013), the U.S. Bank (1,068), SunTrust Bank (1,109), First 
Union National Bank (2,323) and Bank of America (4,463). By 2014, the number of entities 
with just one branch had fallen by a half (around 2,500 entities). Moreover, 11 entities had 
more than 1,000 branches: KeyBank National Association (1,021), TD Bank, National 
Association (1,322), Fifth Third Bank (1,346), SunTrust Bank (1,504), Regions Bank (1,667), 
Branch Banking and Trust Company (1,832), PNC Bank (2,810), U.S. Bank (3,190), Bank of 
America (5,052), JPMorgan Chase Bank (5,595), and Wells Fargo Bank (6,247).  
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4.3 Empirical Strategy   
 
The first objective of our empirical analysis is to determine the effect of mergers in the 
deployment of bank branches before and after the 2008 financial crisis. To do this, we take 
advantage of the panel structure of our dataset to estimate a county fixed effects model that 
allows controlling for the omitted variables that are correlated with the variables of interest and 
which do not change over time. The county fixed effects model focuses on the within variation 
of the data so that it controls for the effect of time-invariant variables, such as state fixed effects. 
Furthermore, our model includes year dummies to control for time shocks that are common 
across counties.  
 
The variable of interest of our model is Branch Densitykt., which is the number of bank branches 
per inhabitant in county k in year t. This variable allows us to account for differences in the 
counties’ population size. Our dataset contains a high number of small banks with very few 
branches, which means the distribution of the variable Branch Densitykt.is highly skewed (to 
the right). For this reason, we apply natural logarithms to this variable to obtain a distribution 
that is less asymmetric and which conforms to normality.14  
 
Branch density is determined by local market competition, the banks’ commercial strategy, and 
the size of the market. Taking this into account, we can estimate the following model for county 
k in year t: 
  
Log_Branch Densitykt = β0 + β1Mergerskt + β2 De Novo Bankskt + β3 Bank Failureskt+ β4 Lag HHI Depositkt         
+ β5 Saving & Loanskt + β6 Lag Total Depositskt + β7 Dmetrokt+ β8 Dmicrokt   + β9 Density Pop kt + β10 Incomekt  
+ β11 Unemploymentkt  + β12Yeart + β13 Countyt + εkt        
(1) 
 
We use three variables that reflect the impact of mergers in local markets. First Mergers 
captures the number of bank entities in a county that have been affected by a merger or an 
acquisition. To address the possibility that the mergers decisions are not exogenous with 
                                                          
14 Figure 1A in the Appendix shows the distribution of the dependent variable with and without the log 
transformation, confirming that the log transformation corrects the problem of skewness. 
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respect to the counties’ local economic conditions, our analysis focusses on Inter-States 
Mergers (the merging entities have their headquarters in different states) and Intra-States/ 
Inter-County (the merging entities have their headquarters in the same state, but not in the same 
county). Out of the total number of mergers in the study period 28.9% are Inter-States Mergers 
and 52.1% are Intra-States/Inter-County mergers. As explained in section 3, the type of 
mergers we examine might respond to different objectives, including the expansion into other 
markets and market consolidation.  An essential aspect of our identification strategy is that the 
mergers decisions form part of the banks’ general competitive strategy and are not the response 
of the specific situation of local markets. For this reason our analysis does not consider Intra-
County Mergers. 
 
Equation (1) also includes the variables Bank Failures and De Novo Banks, which reflect the 
impact of the general economic situation on the market structure. As we have seen, the crisis 
forced some entities out of the market and limited the creation of new entities. The closure of 
a bank should reduce the number of branches in the affected counties, unless this effect is offset 
by other entities. 
 
We consider other control variables to reflect competition in local markets. First, Lag HHI 
Deposits is a Herfindahl index that measures the concentration of bank deposits at the county 
level. We expect a higher concentration of deposits to imply a smaller presence of bank 
branches. To account for the possible endogeneity of this variable, we include it in the model 
with a lag. Second, different types of banks might have different commercial policies. To 
reflect this situation, the model includes the variable Saving & Loan, which is the percentage 
of savings and loan institutions in the county. Savings and loan banks are locally oriented and 
place stronger emphasis on residential mortgages, whereas commercial banks tend to 
concentrate more on businesses and on unsecured credit services such as credit cards. 
 
Other variables are used to capture the size and profitability of local markets. Lag Total 
Deposits represents the total deposits kept by local residents. The existence of a large number 
of deposits in the county should induce banks to create new branches to compete more 
effectively against rivals. The potential endogeneity of this variable is treated by including it 
with a lag. We also classify counties as Metropolitan, Micropolitan and Non-core to reflect 
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their size, with Non-core being the baseline case. This variable should also be related to the 
characteristics and preferences of the county’s inhabitants (profession, education, number of 
investments, proximity to businesses, etc.).  
 
Finally, a set of variables represents the socio-economic characteristics of the population living 
in each county. Density Population is the ratio between a county’s population and its area. 
Income is the median income in the county. Unemployment represents the percentage of 
population in the county that is unemployed. 
 
The estimation of the model in equation (1) may present problems of heteroscedasticity and 
temporal autocorrelation in the error term. In all regressions, the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data reveals that a problem of serial autocorrelation may exist. 
Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test shows that heteroscedasticity problems 
may also be present. To deal with this situation, we estimate the fixed effects model with 
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, which assume that the error structure is heteroscedastic and 
autocorrelated up to two year lags.  
 
All tables in the next section report the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of the explanatory 
variables. Multicollinearity can exaggerate estimates of the variance parameter and distort its 
statistical significance, even, in the most extreme cases, resulting in parameter estimates of 
implausible magnitude. In this regard, all tables report a VIF value below 5, an accepted 
reference in the literature.15 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. We 
observe that non-core counties have a much smaller number of branches, but a higher number 
of branches per inhabitant. More generally, non-core counties are poorer, less dense, with a 
greater proportion of older people, and a more concentrated market. These counties also have 
lower broadband penetration. 
 
                                                          
15 VIFs are widely used to examine the degree of multicollinearity between explanatory variables. Several rules 
of thumb for VIFs have been used as a sign of severe multicollinearity. The one typically considered in 
Econometrics textbooks is 10, although a commonly used value is 5. 
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5. Results 
5.1. General results 
 
This section examines the factors determining the presence of bank branches in the US 
counties, focusing on the effect of mergers in the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period. Table 2 
presents the main results of our analysis for the whole period 2000–2014. Results in 
specification I show that mergers had a positive and significant impact on branch density. In 
particular, each merger led to a 0.3% increase in the counties’ branch density. Specification II 
obtains similar results when we distinguish between inter-states mergers and intra-states/inter-
county mergers, which increased branch density by 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively. These 
findings imply that if an average metropolitan county with 220.000 inhabitants and a branch 
density of 3,2 was exposed to 3 mergers, it will experience an increase in the number of 
branches from 70 to around 71. Notice that this is the net result of the mergers for the whole 
period and does not reflect the heterogeneous effects of the mergers across time and for 
different types of counties. 
 
Table A2 in the Appendix examines the same regressions than in Table 2 but using the log of 
the total number of branches as dependent variable. We find similar results than before 
although now the variable of inter-sates mergers loses its statistical significance. Hence, during 
the period inter states mergers have a significant impact in terms of branch density but not in 
terms of the total number of branches. 
 
Other interesting results in Table 2 are that the entry of new entities in the county had a positive 
effect on the number of branches, but that bank failures did not have a significant impact. The 
variable Lag HHI Deposits, showing a marked concentration at the county level, presents a 
negative and significant coefficient, implying that competition was a key determinant of the 
banks’ commercial strategy. Moreover, those counties with a stronger presence of Saving & 
Loan entities had a larger number of branches per inhabitant. Finally, we also obtain that branch 
density is lower in denser counties. In denser counties, each branch may provide services to a 
higher number of inhabitants. However, controlling for the rest of explanatory variables, rural 
counties have a lower branch density than the other two types of counties.  
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Table 3 divides the sample in two periods to identify the existence of different patterns for 
branch deployment before and after the 2008 financial crisis. The first column shows a positive 
effect of both types of mergers on branch density before 2008: one inter-states mergers 
increased branch density by 0.9% and one intra-states/intra-county merger by 0.7%. These 
results confirm the hypothesis that the “expansion mergers” that took place before 2008 
increased competition in local markets and favored branch deployment. The second column 
reveals that after the crisis both types of mergers had a negative and significant impact on 
branch density: one inter-states merger reduced branch density by 1% and one intra-
states/intra-county merger by 0.4%. These findings support the idea that market consolidation 
and cost reduction were key objectives underpinning the mergers of this period.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that the lower branch density of rural counties in relation to the 
other two types of counties is only statistically significant after the crisis. This implies that 
branch consolidation has been relatively more intense in rural counties. We also observe a 
negative relationship between branch density and income in the period before the crisis, which 
became positive after the crisis. Again, banks adjusted their commercialization strategy after 
the crisis, reducing their presence in poorer counties.  
 
5.2. Heterogeneous geographic effects 
 
We next explore in greater detail the relevance of our merger and competition variables when 
dividing the sample into metropolitan, micropolitan and non-core counties. Table 4 shows that 
for the period 2000–2014 the positive effect of mergers on branch density was confined mainly 
to metropolitan counties. For micropolitan and non-core counties, inter-state mergers had a 
negative effect, while intra-state/ inter county mergers only had a negative and significant 
effect on rural counties. Hence, while banks used expansion mergers as a mechanism to gain 
size and to compete more fiercely for consumers in metropolitan counties, in the other 
geographical areas mergers led to the closure of branches and to the consolidation of the 
entities. 
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Table A3 in the Appendix repeats the analysis reported in Table 4 but using the log of the total 
number of branches as dependent variable. In this case, the variable of inter-states mergers for 
metropolitan counties loses its statistical significance. 
 
Similar insights than in the previous tables are found for the competition and socio-economic 
variables. Thus, in all counties, the presence of de novo banks and savings and loan entities 
increased branch density and density of population had a negative impact. On the other hand, 
while deposits concentration had a negative effect on branch density in metropolitan counties, 
it had a positive and significant impact in micropolitan and non-core counties. Intense 
competition in micropolitan and rural counties may harm the efficiency in the deployment of 
the commercial network of banks. 
 
Finally, Table 5 considers the effects of mergers for the different county types before and after 
the crisis. Before 2008, inter-states mergers and intra-states/inter-counties mergers generated 
an increase of branch density of 1% in metropolitan counties, while they implied a reduction 
of branch density of 1% and 2%, respectively, on rural counties. Inter-states mergers had a 
negative impact on branch density in micropolitan counties, while intra states/inter-county 
mergers had a positive effect on them. After 2008, inter-states mergers reduced branch density 
in all counties, but especially in micropolitan and rural, where one merger implied a 3% 
reduction of branch density. By contrast, intra-states/inter-county mergers had not effect on 
branch density. These results confirm our claim that before 2008 mergers in metropolitan 
counties increased branch density, but clarify that this result cannot be generalized to inter-
states mergers in micropolitan and rural counties, where mergers had a consolidation impact 
and reduced branch density.  
 
5.3. Large banks 
 
The previous sections have examined the heterogeneous impacts of mergers across periods and 
for different types of counties. Next, we seek to complement this analysis by considering 
whether large banks could have different motivations to participate in mergers and if these 
mergers had a differentiated effect on branch density. Following the FDIC, we define large 
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banks as those having more than 1 billion assets, and we repeat the previous analysis focusing 
in those mergers in which the acquiring entity was a large bank.  
 
Table 6 summarizes our results, which in essence are similar that those obtained before. If 
anything, we obtain that before 2008 mergers with the participation of large banks had a 
stronger effect for branch density than the rest of mergers. After the financial crisis, mergers 
of large entities entailed a smaller consolidation effect than the rest of mergers. We also obtain 
that the positive effect of mergers on metropolitan counties and the negative effect for the rest 
of counties is more intense when large banks participate in the mergers. 
 
5.4. Broadband expansion and brick-and-mortar branches 
 
In the last years, the growth in the use of on-line banking has reduced the visits of customer to 
brick-and-mortar branches and might have contributed to branch closures. We incorporate this 
situation in our analysis by accounting for broadband deployment at the county level, which 
we consider as an essential determinant for the use of on-line banking. 
 
For this extension of the model we use a dataset from the Center for Policy Informatics at 
Arizona State University. The analysis covers 328 counties, most of them metropolitan, for 
which information on broadband penetration is available for the whole period. The results of 
our analysis are presented in Table 7, where the variable Broadband Penetration represents the 
percentage of the population in the county with access to high speed Internet. Column I shows 
that broadband penetration is negatively related to branch density when we consider the whole 
period. Column II and III then shows the effect of broadband penetration before and after the 
financial crisis of 2008, showing that after the crisis the presence of a high broadband 
penetration is associated with a smaller branch density.  In terms of elasticities, a 1% increase 
in broadband penetration lead to a 3% decrease in branch density. Both when we consider the 
entire sample and when we focus on the period after the crisis. This analysis also confirms the 
positive impact of inter-states merger on branch density before 2008. After this year, the effect 
of this type of mergers on branch density is negative and non-significant and the effect of intra-
state/inter county mergers was positive and significant. Recall that in this regression we are 
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using a subsample of counties (most of them metropolitan counties), which can distort the 
identification of the effect of mergers variables.  
 
Our results suggest that during the market consolidation period banks were more likely to close 
branches in counties with a larger use of broadband Internet. This situation has important policy 
implications for the sector. First, banks might be more likely to close branches in counties in 
which consumers have a better access to on-line banking, although this can reduce the quality 
of the financial advice they offer. Second, consumers’ access to broadband services might 
differ importantly within each county, which implies that after a branch closure some 
consumers might lose their access to banking services. In this regard, Table A4 in the Appendix 
presents an auxiliary regression in which we show that in the US broadband penetration is 
lower in rural, poorer and less populated counties. This analysis considers all counties in 2014, 
the only year for which broadband data is available at a national level.  
 
 
6. Bank branches and financial exclusion 
 
One implication of branch closures is that consumers might have increasing difficulties to 
obtain personalized advice and access to essential financial services. This section explores this 
issue by examining the impact of branch closures on financial exclusion. We use the FDIC’s 
NSUUH dataset to analyze whether the reduction in branch density after 2008 increased the 
percentage of Unbanked and Underbanked households at the county level. The NSUUH 
defines “unbanked” households as those in which none of the members have a checking or 
savings account and “underbanked” households as those that have a checking or savings 
account but which obtain financial products or services outside insured banking institutions. In 
2011 the share of unbanked and underbanked households was 8.2 and 20.5%, respectively, 
while in 2015 the percentages fell to 7 and 18.1%.16   
 
                                                          
16 For Underbanked we use a restrictive definition considering households that carried out “money orders” or 
“cash checking” in the past 12 months using an institution other than a bank. These two specific questions have 
been included in the FDIC surveys since 2011. The NSUUH includes additional questions relevant to underbanked 
households, but they were included after 2011 and, so, are unsuitable for our study. 
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Our analysis uses as control variables the same county attributes we have considered in the 
previous sections: namely, the county’s median income, unemployment, population density, 
and a dummy variable for metropolitan counties. In addition, we consider the county’ total 
population and two demographic variables representing about the population living in each 
county: Population over 60 represents the percentage of population aged over 60 and Minorites 
is the percentage of minority ethnic groups in the county, accounting for the possibility that 
minority groups are excluded from financial services.17 Furthermore, we consider the share of 
community banks in the county to examine whether this type of banks may help in mitigating 
financial exclusion.  
 
We first consider the impact of the number of county bank branches on the share of Unbanked 
households. Column I in Table 8 shows that the share of unbanked households in a county is 
negatively associated with the number of bank branches. This implies that those counties 
affected by a reduction in the number of branches since 2008 have been affected by an increase 
in the number of unbanked households. 
 
One potential problem of this analysis is that the share of unbanked households and the number 
of bank branches could be simultaneously determined. Indeed, it could be argued that the share 
of unbanked households in a county affects the number of bank branches and that unobserved 
shocks may be correlated with the share of unbanked households and the number of branches. 
To address this issue of endogeneity, we implement an instrumental variables (IV) procedure 
in which we use the merger variables from the previous regressions as instruments of the bank 
branches variable. The results of the first stage regression (not reported here for the sake of 
simplicity) confirm that Inter-State Merger is a strong instrument as it is statistically significant 
at the 1% level with the expected negative sign. Column II in Table 8 presents the results of 
the IV estimation, which confirm the negative relationship between the share of unbanked 
households and the total number of bank branches. These results offer additional evidence that 
the fall in the number of branches may lead to financial exclusion. Note also that the 
                                                          
17 As in the previous regressions, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroscedasticity show that both problems need correcting. Hence, we estimate the fixed effects model 
with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. Furthermore, the VIF suggests that multicollinearity is not a concern in 
our context. 
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consideration of the number of bank branches as exogenous leads to an underestimation of the 
impact of this variable on the share of unbanked households.  
 
As expected, we also find that the share of unbanked households is lower in richer counties. 
Furthermore, the share of unbanked households may be higher in larger and less compact 
counties, although the effect of Total Population and Density of Population is diluted in the IV 
regression. Surprisingly, we find a negative effect of the variable that captures the percentage 
of people from minority ethnic groups, although its significance disappears in the IV 
regression.  
 
Finally, Column III in Table 8 shows that the percentage of Underbanked households in a 
county is negatively associated with the number of bank branches. As before, this suggests that 
the counties most affected by the reduction in number of branches after 2008 have seen the 
number of underbanked households rise, meaning that the latter have to rely more on non-bank 
institutions to contract such services as “money orders” or “cash checking”.18 As expected, we 
also find that the percentage of underbanked households is higher in poorer counties and in 
counties with a higher proportion of vulnerable population. This percentage is also higher in 
denser and more populated counties. Finally, the percentage of underbanked households is 
lower in those counties where the share of community banks is higher. This is not surprising as 
community banks are characterized as having a closer relationship with costumers.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Our empirical analysis has shown that inter-state and intra-state/inter county bank mergers 
contributed to the increase in branch density before 2008. However, the impact of mergers was 
positive in metropolitan counties, mixed in micropolitan counties and negative in rural 
                                                          
18 Note that the bank branches variable should not be so greatly affected by the type of endogeneity problems we 
have discussed for unbanked households, as all underbanked households have a bank account. In spite of this, it 
remains possible that the presence of customers of this type reduces the profitability of the bank branches. Taking 
this into account, we also applied the IV regression in this case, but the merger variables are not strong instruments 
in this case making the estimation more imprecise.  
26 
 
counties. After 2008, expansion mergers were substituted by consolidation mergers, which had 
a negative effect on branch density in all types of counties.  
 
After the passing of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994, the strategy of the incumbent banks to deploy 
new branches following mergers, in combination with the creation of new banking entities, 
contributed to a proliferation of bank branches. This trend took place against a backdrop of 
population growth and high demand for financial services. However, the Great Recession of 
2008 was to reverse this pattern of the creation of new branches by the multi-state banks. 
Indeed, inter-state mergers led to fewer branches and made it more difficult for the banks’ most 
vulnerable customers to access financial services. The banks’ efficiency targets changed after 
the crisis, spurred, in all probability, by the desire to divert more customers to their online 
services.  
 
Our analysis has also found that weak competition in local markets is a driver of the reduction 
in size of the banks’ branch networks. This is consistent across the whole period examined, 
including both pre- and post-crisis periods. Bank entities in more concentrated markets may be 
better able to exert their market power and force customers either to travel longer distances to 
visit their brick-and-mortar office or to divert customers to their on-line channels (Allen et al., 
2008). Others, however, may become unbanked and be left without access to financial services.   
 
The disappearance of bank branches in rural areas has been accrued by the effect of mergers 
during all the period examined. This situation is not always offset by on-line banking, due to 
low rates of broadband penetration in these areas and the lack of digital skill for a part of the 
population. As a result, a part of the consumers are at risk of being marginalised from financial 
services. In addition, the loss of soft information may well have been detrimental for customers 
and have resulted in increased rates of consumer bankruptcy (Allen et al., 2016).  
 
The main policy implications to be derived from our study are that public policies promoting 
bank competition and on line banking need to take into account the impact of these policies on 
financial inclusion. There is a large literature showing that the intensification of competition 
promotes access to banking services for low-income households; yet, in spite of this, market 
consolidation can create ‘banking deserts’ that negatively affect the access of the more 
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vulnerable population to financial services. Our analysis, conducted for a sub-set of 
metropolitan counties, has shown that the share of unbanked and underbanked households is 
negatively related to the number of bank branches per inhabitant. Improving Internet access in 
less-dense areas and offering financial advice to vulnerable households may be a necessary 
policy to mitigate the progressive reduction of bank branches.  
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Figure 1. Bank entities and branches, 2000-2014 
Source: Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
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Figure 2. Percentage of counties by number of branches  
Source: Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
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Figure 3. Number of branches per 10,000 inhabitants, by type of county 
Source: Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and US Census Bureau 
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Figure 4. Accumulated number of counties affected by mergers 
 
Source: Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and US Census Bureau 
Note: At 2014, the number of total counties in our sample is as follows: 1217 metropolitan 
counties, 646 micropolitan counties, 1311 rural counties  
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Figure 5: Distribution of the number of branches by bank entity 
 
 
  
Source: Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC)  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: types of counties. Period 2000-2014 
Variables All counties Metropolitan 
counties 
Micropolitan 
counties 
Rural  
counties 
 
Number of Branches 
 
28.65  
(72.62) 
 
60.39  
(111.36) 
 
15.45  
(10.15) 
 
6.91  
(5.53) 
Number Branches per Inhabitant 0.0004  
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0001) 
0.0004 
(0.0002) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
Population  (inhabitants) 97306.99  
(310709.4) 
220706.1 
(483045.1) 
42426.2 
(28542.87) 
14550.79 
(12013.68) 
Income  (US dollars) 41206.72 
(11116.31) 
47327.81 
(12417.55) 
39551.19 
(8731.73) 
36573.66 
(7968.50) 
Unemployment rate  6.43 
(2.78) 
6.23 
(2.51) 
6.67 
(2.77) 
6.49 
(2.98) 
Density of Population 
 (inhabitants per square mile) 
206.98 
(1216.04) 
486.99  
(1954.93) 
66.41  
(88.25) 
27.16  
(88.71) 
Population over 60 Years 0.21 
(0.05) 
0.19  
(0.05) 
0.20  
(0.04) 
0.24  
(0.05) 
Minority Ethnic Groups 0.13 
 (0.16) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
HHI Deposits 0.31 
(0.20) 
0.26  
(0.19) 
0.27  
(0.17) 
0.41  
(0.22) 
Deposits (US dollars) 2133637 
 (1.36+e07) 
5125850 
(2.19e+07) 
600567.3 
(578371.2) 
228579.9 
(384574.4) 
Number of Mergers 0. 121 
(0.50) 
0. 231 
(0.75) 
0.079 
(0.29) 
0.043 
(0.21) 
Inter State Mergers 0.035 
(0.22) 
0.075 
(0.33) 
0.017 
(0.13) 
0.008 
(0.09) 
Intra State & Inter County mergers 0. 063 
(0.28) 
0. 106 
(0.37) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.031 
(0.18) 
New Entities 0.008 
(0.10) 
0.01  
(0.15) 
0.003  
(0.05) 
0.001  
(0.04) 
Saving & Loan Entities 0.09 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.06 
 (0.12) 
Share Community banks 0.18 
(0.23) 
0.12 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.24 
(0.28) 
Broadband Penetration 54.50 
(26.78) 
73.66  
(16.38) 
58.28 
 (12.84) 
52.82 
 (9.70) 
 
Observations 
 
46321 
 
18308 
 
9666 
 
19682 
Note: Mean values in 2000-2014, except the variable of broadband penetration that is for 2014. Standard errors 
in parenthesis 
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Table 2. Estimation results: baseline regression 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Branch Density 
 I II 
 
Mergers 
 
0.003 (0.001)** 
                                   - 
Inter States Mergers - 0.003 (0.002)* 
Intra State & Inter County Mergers - 0.004 (0.002)* 
New Entities 0.02 (0.003)*** 0.02 (0.003)*** 
Bank Failures 1.45e-06 (9.83e-06) 2.29e-06 (8.45e-06) 
Lag HHI Deposits -0.64 (0.04)*** -0.64 (0.04)*** 
Saving & Loan Entities 0.0005 (0.0001)*** 0.0006 (0.0001)*** 
Lag Total Deposits 0.15 (0.01)*** 0.15 (0.001)*** 
D Metropolitan Counties 0.03 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
D Micropolitan Counties 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Density of Population -0.00009 (0.00002)*** -0.00009 (0.00002)*** 
Income -4.84e-07 (5.74e-07) -4.86e-07 (5.74e-07) 
Unemployment rate -0.002 (0.001) 
 
-0.002 (0.01) 
R2 (within) 0.14 0.14 
F-test (Ho: Null joint significance) 3.04e+14*** 6.71e+07*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroscedasticity                    
(Ho: Constant variance) 
41.05*** 37.83*** 
Wooldridge test (Ho: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
1262.07*** 1262.02*** 
Mean VIF 1.89 1.88 
Number observations 43181 43181 
Notes: All regressions include county and year fixed effects Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  
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Table. 3 Estimation results: Regressions before and after the financial crisis 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Branch Density 
Sample 2000-2007 2008-2014 
   
Inter States Mergers 0.009 (0.001)*** -0.01 (0.001)*** 
Intra State & Inter County mergers 0.007 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.001)*** 
New Entities 0.01 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)*** 
Bank Failures -0.00004 (0.00001)*** -5.30e-06 (4.25e-06) 
Lag HHI Deposits -0.47 (0.07)*** -0.56 (0.05)*** 
Saving & Loan Entities 0.0005 (0.0001)*** 0.0008 (0.0001)*** 
Lag Total Deposits 0.11 (0.01)*** 0.17 (0.01)*** 
D Metropolitan Counties 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.01)*** 
D Micropolitan Counties 0.03 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01)*** 
Density of Population -0.0003 (0.00007)*** -0.0002 (0.00001)*** 
Income -2.54e-06 (9,11e-07)*** 2.81e-07 (1.56e-07)* 
Unemployment rate -0.0002 (0.0005) 0.0008 (0.0007) 
 
R2 (within) 0.11 0.18 
F-test (Ho: Null joint significance) 750999.28*** 147.53*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroscedasticity                    
(Ho: Constant variance) 
33.00*** 11.64*** 
Wooldridge test (Ho: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
516.76*** 2364.84*** 
Mean VIF 1.72 1.76 
Number of observations 21585 21596 
Notes: All regressions include all control factors, country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses (robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% 
(**), 10% (*). 
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Table 4. Estimation results: different types of counties 
 
Notes: All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  
 
 
  
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Branch Density 
Sample Metropolitan 
counties 
Micropolitan 
counties 
Rural counties 
    
Inter States Mergers 0.003 (0.001)** -0.02 (0.005)*** -0.02 (0.003)*** 
Intra State/Inter County Mergers 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.0006 (0.002) -0.004 (0.001)** 
New Entities 0.01 (0.001)*** 0.03 (0.007)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Bank Failures 7.64e-07 (7.57e-06) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0007) 
Lag HHI Deposits -0.63 (0.06)*** 0.14 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.009)*** 
Saving & Loan Entities 0.0004 (0.0002)** 0.0004 (0.0001)*** 0.0005 (0.0002)*** 
Lag Total Deposits 0.22 (0.02)*** 0.14 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.009)*** 
Density of Population -0.00005 (0.00002)** -0.006 (0.0005)*** -0.005 (0.001)*** 
Income -5.70e-08 (4.83e-07) -8.08e-07 (5.45e-07) -8.44e-07 (4.83e-07) 
Unemployment rate -0.0009 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)** 
R2 (within) 0.20 0.19 0.15 
F-test (Ho: Null joint 
significance) 
1877677.88*** 2677969.66*** 2.07e+07*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroscedasticity                    
(Ho: Constant variance) 
610.76*** 14.89*** 5.21** 
Wooldridge test (Ho: no first-
order autocorrelation 
453.03*** 1014.55*** 458.22*** 
Mean VIF 1.90 1.80 1.77 
Number of observations 16119 8942 18120 
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Table 5. Estimation results: subsamples before and after the crisis & type of counties 
Note: All regressions include all control factors, county and year fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses (robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% 
(**), 10% (*). 
 
  
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Log Branch Density 
Sample Metropolitan counties Micropolitan counties Rural counties 
Sub-Sample 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 
       
Inter States Mergers 0.01 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.001)*** 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
-0.03 
(0.006)*** 
-0.02 
(0.003)*** 
-0.03 
(0.006)*** 
Intra State & Inter 
County Mergers 
0.01 
(0.001)*** 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.01 
(0.001)*** 
-0.00005 
(0.003) 
R2 (within) 0.15 0.26 0.17 0.32 0.13 0.10 
Number observations 8050 8069 4470 4472 9065 9055 
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Table 6. Estimation results: mergers of big banks 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Branch Density 
 All All 2000-2007 2008-2014 Metropolitan 
counties 
Micropolitan 
counties 
Rural 
counties 
 
Mergers 
 
0.004 
(0.001)** 
                                   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Mergers -Inter States  - 0.006 
(0.002)** 
0.012 
(0.001)*** 
-0.009 
(0.001)*** 
0.007 
(0.001)*** 
-0.016 
(0.004)*** 
-0.06 
(0.006)*** 
Mergers - Intra State  
& Inter County  
- 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.002)*** 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
0.007 
(0.02)*** 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.004)** 
R2 (within) 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.15 
Number observations 43181 43181 21585 21596 16121 8947 18113 
Note: All regressions include county and year fixed effects Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  
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Table 7. Estimation results: broadband penetration 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Branch Density 
Sample All 2000-2007 2008-2014 
    
Inter States Mergers 0.003 (0.0008)*** 0.01 (0.001)*** -0.0005 (0.0009) 
Intra State & Inter County Mergers 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.008)*** 
New Entities 0.003 (0.001)** 0.004 (0.001)*** -0.003 (0.004) 
Bank Failures -0.002 (0.007) 0.004 (0.007) -0.01 (0.005)*** 
Lag HHI Deposits -1.12 (0.17)*** -0.39 (0.09)*** -1.03 (0.20)*** 
Saving & Loan Entities -0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.003 (0.0004)*** 
Lag Deposits 0.28  (9.004)*** 0.14 (0.03)*** 0.29 (0.06)*** 
Density of Population -8.86e-06 (0.00002) -0.0003 (0.0001)** -0.00007 (0.00002)*** 
Income 3.27e-07 (4.58e-07) -3.41e-07 (1.19e-06) 1.01e-07 (3.06e-07) 
Unemployment rate 0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Broadband Penetration -0.06 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.07) -0.05 (0.01)*** 
    
R2  0.33 0.27 0.41 
F-test (Ho: Null joint significance) 12107.20*** 16596.90*** 11063.01*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity    
(Ho: Constant variance)  
617.27 *** 33.26*** 615.82*** 
Wooldridge test  
(Ho: no first-order autocorrelation) 
595.63*** 71.76 *** 2493.68*** 
Mean VIF 2.79 2.42 1.90 
Number of observations 3682 1529 2164 
Note: All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  Regressions in 
columns 1-4 are for 330 counties, while regression in column 5 is for all counties.  
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Table 8. Estimation results: unbanked and underbanked share regressions 
 
Notes: All regressions include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). We use 
the variables Mergers Inter State and Mergers Intra-State & Inter-county as instruments for number of 
bank branches in the instrumental variables regression in specification (II). In the (unreported) 
instrumental variables regressions with the share of underbanked population as dependent variable, not 
a single explanatory variable is statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: 
 Share of Unbanked   
Dependent variable: 
Share of Underbanked   
 (I)  (II)  (III) 
    
Number of Branches -0.017 (0.004)*** -0.14 (0.06)** -0.06 (0.01)*** 
D Metropolitan Counties 0.45 (0.29) 0.15 (1.09) 4.82 (1.78)*** 
Total Population 6.72e-06 (7.80e-07)*** 4.44e-06 (8.36e-06) 0.00001 (6.60e-06) 
Density of Population -0.002 (0.0005)*** -0.002 (0.002) 0.01 (0.0004)*** 
Income -0.00006 (1.71e-06)*** -0.00007 (0.00002)*** -0.000017 (6.10e-06)*** 
Unemployment rate 0.19 (0.09)** 0.20 (0.19) 0.17 (0.13) 
Population over 60 years -0.02 (0.15) 0.05 (0.68) 2.53 (0.18)*** 
Minority Ethnic Groups -39.28 (8.33)*** -62.34 (59.03) 21.48 (18.00) 
Share Community banks -1.70 (3.71) -0.23 (7.18) -9.63 (4.03)*** 
R2 (within) 0.02 - 0.05 
F-test 
 (Ho: Null joint significance) 
11.19*** 2.04** 44.77*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity 
 (Ho: Constant variance) 
 
131.51*** 
 
8.85*** 
Wooldridge test  
(Ho: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
828.117*** 361.56*** 
Mean VIF 3.12 3.03 
Underidentification test of all 
instruments(Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic) 
- 6.81** - 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments) 
- 0.29 - 
Number observations 1093 1093 899 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Evolution of bank branches and population, 2000-2014 
Year Population 
Variation 
Population 
(%) 
Branches 
Variation 
Branches 
(%) 
Population/Branches 
Variation 
Population/Branches 
(%) 
2000 281,703,392 - 83,510 - 3,373 - 
2001 284,498,464 0.99% 84,250 0.89% 3,377 0.11% 
2002 287,153,664 0.93% 85,040 0.94% 3,377 0.00% 
2003 289,633,696 0.86% 86,507 1.73% 3,348 -0.85% 
2004 292,366,944 0.94% 88,874 2.74% 3,290 -1.74% 
2005 295,104,224 0.94% 91,165 2.58% 3,237 -1.60% 
2006 297,961,856 0.97% 93,907 3.01% 3,173 -1.98% 
2007 300,810,432 0.96% 96,392 2.65% 3,121 -1.65% 
2008 303,670,816 0.95% 98,241 1.92% 3,091 -0.95% 
2009 306,347,424 0.88% 98,571 0.34% 3,108 0.54% 
2010 308,877,408 0.83% 97,518 -1.07% 3,167 1.91% 
2011 311,259,104 0.77% 97,143 -0.38% 3,204 1.16% 
2012 313,640,096 0.76% 96,254 -0.92% 3,258 1.70% 
2013 315,961,984 0.74% 95,254 -1.04% 3,317 1.80% 
2014 317,879,264 0.61% 93,656 -1.68% 3,394 2.32% 
 
Source: FDIC and US Census Bureau 
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Table A2. Estimation results: baseline regression 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Number of Branches  
 I II 
 
Mergers 
 
0.001 (0.006)** 
                                   - 
Inter States Mergers - -0.001 (0.001) 
Intra State & Inter County Mergers - 0.005 (0.002)*** 
New Entities 0.02 (0.003)*** 0.02 (0.003)*** 
Bank Failures 0.00001 (8.17e-06) 0.00001 (7.30e-06) 
Lag HHI Deposits -0.75 (0.03)*** -0.75 (0.03)*** 
Saving & Loan Entities 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
Lag Total Deposits 0.23 (0.01)*** 0.23 (0.001)*** 
D Metropolitan Counties 0.03 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
D Micropolitan Counties 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
Population 5.82-e07 (7.61e-08)*** 5.90-e07 (7.62e-08)*** 
Density of Population 0.0001 (0.00003)*** -0.00009 (0.00002)***) 
Income 7.26e-08 (2.43e-07) 8.05e-08 (2.45e-07) 
Unemployment rate 0.0005 (0.0009) 
 
0.0005 (0.0009) 
R2 (within) 0.28 0.28 
F-test (Ho: Null joint significance) 9067439.07*** 2.41e+07*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroscedasticity                    
(Ho: Constant variance) 
1336.52*** 1309.11*** 
Wooldridge test (Ho: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
1046.15*** 1046.28*** 
Mean VIF 2.01 1.97 
Number observations 43181 43181 
Notes: All regressions include county and year fixed effects Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).  
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Table A3. Estimation results (types of counties) 
Explanatory variables Dependent variable: Log Number of Branches  
Sample Metropolitan counties Micropolitan counties Rural counties 
    
Inter States Mergers 0.0002 (0.0008) -0.02 (0.005)*** -0.02 (0.003)*** 
Intra State & Inter County Mergers 0.006 (0.002)*** -0.001 (0.002) -0.006 (0.001)*** 
New Entities  0.02 (0.002)*** 0.0005 (0.0005)*** 0.04 (0.02)*** 
Bank Failures 0.004 (0.006) 0.01 (0.03) -0.002 (0.01) 
Lag HHI Deposits -0.67 (0.09)*** -0.47 (0.09)*** -0.77 (0.06)*** 
Saving & Loan Entities 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0005 (0.0001)*** 
Population 8.11e-07 (1.13e-07)*** 2.28e-06 (8.64e-07)*** 0.00001 (2.08e-06)*** 
Density of Population 0.0002 (0.0003)*** 0.0005 (0.0003)** 0.001 (0.0006) 
Income 1.78e-06 (6.79e-07)*** 2.18e-06 (7.26e-07)*** 9.61e-07 (1.50e-07)*** 
Unemployment rate -0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.0008)** 
R2 (within) 0.27 0.16 0.16 
F-test (Ho: Null joint significance) 490211.46*** 3156973.48*** 651283.88*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test 
for heteroscedasticity  
(Ho: Constant variance) 
2806.75*** 48.02*** 2633.56*** 
Wooldridge test  
(Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
381.35*** 1108.69*** 402.54*** 
Mean VIF 1.93 1.72 1.67 
Number of observations 16119 8942 18120 
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Table A4. Estimation results: broadband penetration 
Explanatory variables 
Sample 2014 
  
D Metropolitan Counties 16.86 (0.76)*** 
D Micropolitan Counties 4.88 (0.57)*** 
Density of Population 0.0002 (0.0003) 
Population 9.95e-06 (3.40e-06)*** 
Income 0.0002 (0.00002)*** 
Unemployment rate -0.29 (0.10)*** 
 
R2  0.41 
F-test (Ho: Null joint significance) 321.98*** 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity    
(Ho: Constant variance)  
336.71*** 
Mean VIF 1.25 
Number of observations 3078 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation). Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 
10% (*).  
 
 
 
49 
 
Figure 1A. Histograms dependent variable
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